The purpose of this paper is to stimulate critical thinking about China's ability to consistently grow its economy by leveraging its information and communication (ICT) 
Introduction
In the popular book, "Globalization and Its Discontents", author and 2001 Nobel Laureate in Economics Science Joseph Stiglitz outlined many of the reasons why globalization has become so controversial. He concludes, among other well-cited positations, that countries that embrace international trade improve their economies more than they would otherwise, and that export-led growth is the centerpiece of the industrial policy that enriched Asia and "left millions of people there far better off" (Stiglitz, 2002) . The recent rise to prominence by China, characterized by massive foreign-funded investments in manufacturing capacity and information & communication technologies (ICT) linking Chinese production centers with Japanese and Western multinational corporations (MNCs), appears to illustrate his central thesis.
The question that remains for China, for the purposes of this study, is whether Chinese manufacturers can continue to weave their firms (and the nation's pool of educated workers) into the global supply chain, achieving sustainable competitive advantage. Once accomplished, additional value added opportunities leading toward further innovation within China may occur. A parallel can be drawn between the point in time where China is today and where Mexico was just prior to joining NAFTA. Approximately 10 years ago, the framework laid out by the NAFTA terms made it possible for Mexico to achieve a similar weaving of its workers into the (mostly U.S.) value chain. The Mexican economy, as expected, improved greatly during the late 1990s and despite having achieved some competitive advantage, this advantage was nonetheless lost when China opened its doors wide to (mostly U.S. and European) foreign manufacturing activity. Currently, Mexico is mired in economic morass, nostalgically looking backward into its recent past for insight as to what could have been done to prevent losing its competitive advantage. China, on the other hand, is at a point in its upward-spiraling economic development (when comparisons to the Mexican example may be made) as that country strives to nurture its nascent economic development to escape repeating the fate that befell Mexico. This is a difficult task for China to achieve, since it is straddled with concurrent burdens of steering its economy in the right direction, educating and training its workers, and rolling out an advanced ICT infrastructure that will achieve an economic payoff in future business opportunities with the rest of Asia and the West. The resulting challenge of coping with related issues that strain this development are many and include (1) the danger of creating an overheated economy (numerous signs of which have become manifest), (2) addressing internal infrastructural problems created by the vast streams of workers leaving the hinterland in pursuit of the developed coastal cities, and (3) carefully approaching monetarist policies to deal with calls by foreign leaders for the nation to devalue its currency in preparation for a floating Yuan, which, at least in the short-term, is sure to slow economic activity. This paper assesses China's predictability in achieving a sustained competitive advantage made possible, in part, by leveraging the capabilities inherent in its ICT profile. Relying on ICT infrastructure factors compiled by the World Bank and survey data from a report by the World Economic Forum, China's standings relative to similar, competing export-driven nations will be assessed.
China's Position in the Global Knowledge Economy
As part of the plan to move the nation forward as a significant player in the emerging integrated knowledge economies characterizing the 21st century, China's declared strategy of expanding its manufacturing capacity depends upon its ability to (a) update economic and institutional regimes, (b) upgrade education and learning, and (c) create and deploy a sound information infrastructure (Dahlman & Aubert, 2001 ).
So far, China's growth is unprecedented for an Asian economy. Its economic development has mushroomed from an insular economy, leading the nation away from successive failing five-year plans to a level of national advancement characterized by the moniker "socialist market economy". By not repeating the "big bang" approach adopted by Eastern European countries (e.g., Russia) when they attempted to achieve the same goal, China is not in a rush to privatize its industries but is instead bent on opening itself to foreign investment and export-led growth strategies. This feat of sustained economic development was made possible by building out its ICT infrastructure to enable MNCs to interlink Chinese manufacturers into their manufacturing value chain.
The Pace of Change
By leveraging the nation's low labor costs and the inherent knowledge gains made possible by building an ICT infrastructure promoting shared and collaborative production capabilities, China gained competitive advantage over other similar developing nations (Stiglitz, 2002) . Further, the pace at which nations such as China open themselves up to the international economy is quickening (globalization is the catchphrase for this manifestation) and is accelerating as other nations try to catch up, despite the allegations that free trade, the free flow of capital, and rapid economic growth widen the income gaps in society (Larsson, 2001 ). This rate of change is so startling to industry and government leaders that recent protectionist calls by top executives in the public and private sector (notably the United States) cite that this fast pace of globalization wreaks havoc on national economies because they are unable to respond quickly enough to handle the impact that China has on their local economies. Because of this frenzied pace of leveraging ICT assets to gain superior production and marketing capabilities , improvements in telecommunications, interoperability among disparate computing platforms, the "commoditization" of the Internet, and advances in automated manufacturing and CRM software result in quickening the tempo of the beat toward globalization, further simplifying the ease with which manufacturing and service sector processing may be moved to offshore facilities in foreign locales.
Geographic Challenges
For the most part, China's economic miracle is taking place in the coastal cities, more or less following Porter's work on clustering manufacturing centers (Porter, 1990 ). As such, China's endogenous formation and internal sharing of knowledge, made possible by network clusters, results in spatially clustered firms that sustain technological innovation (see Hicks & Niven, 2000) . Accordingly, then, the challenge is to create technology innovation centers throughout China's urban areas. There is some justification to considering Coastal China as a developed economy, albeit currently one of manufacturing. Based on the work of Dewan and Kraemer (2000) an innovation policy that limits IT capital investments to developed coastal areas could be justified. Using this scenario, China's ICT investment blueprint would be based on treating rural China as a developing economy and coastal China as a developed one. Dewan and Kraemer found evidence that for developed countries there can be a clear positive and significant structure of returns for IT capital investment commensurate with the relative factor share.
The Lowest Labor Cost Supplier
While low labor cost nations such as China enjoy the recent economic stimulus made possible by weaving themselves into the production supply chains of (mostly) Japanese and Western MNCs, it remains to be seen how long their ability to respond to changes in product demands will last. After all, the global workforce expansion unfolding over the past twenty years has made it possible for new entrants to gain access to this supply chain through comparatively lower labor costs. Foreign MNCs, driven by a never ending pursuit of lowered production costs and higher profit margins do not necessarily owe any particular allegiance to their suppliers but instead owe allegiance only to shareholders. Eventually, the increased economic growth in China will lead to an appreciating currency, triggering reflexive monetarist intervention policies that mimic Japan's pattern of continually devaluing their currency in order to keep exports attractive and promote the manufacturing centers. For example, recent calls by U.S. Treasury Secretary Andrew Snow to Chinese counterparts to let the Yuan float on international currency markets will eventually lead to its appreciation and cause a rise in the costs of doing business in China.
When this devaluation occurs, several questions become apparent:
1. How will China be able to sustain its competitive posture in the global economy? 2. Will it be able to leverage its ICT infrastructure in new and innovative ways to continue attracting inflows of foreign investment?
3. Will it instead continue to rely on its current competitive advantage -that of being the lowest-priced labor source (following the Mexican example)?
The answers to these questions prove elusive at best. However, finding solutions to them before they become problematic will help divert China away from what noted U.S. Business and Industry Council research fellow Alan Tonelson refers to as the "race to the bottom", led by uncontrolled free trade and sinking American (and, ultimately Chinese) living standards (Tonelson, 2002) .
Avoiding Export Dependency
Hence, China needs to innovate, as did the U.S. in the last half of 20 th century, specializing in information and communication technologies. The unquestioned ICT supremacy that the U.S. enjoys allows it to distribute its production and manufacturing centers throughout the world, driven by various factors that offer competitive advantage. From this perspective, China's factories are merely remote nodes of this international grid; Chinese leaders seem content in having established the nation as one of the world's most prominent workshops. However, the infrastructural components that comprise these manufacturing linkages may have unforeseen consequences (Spencer, 2003) .
Also, since MNCs intrinsically have the ability to extend their competitive advantage beyond borders, they offer China the opportunity to tap into a wealth of technological know-how via knowledge transfer agreements that will serve them in the future. Specifically, infrastructural technologies in particular can be viewed as critical components of competitive advantage because of the higher implicit value they offer compared to components used in isolation (Carr, 2003) .
Innovation requires an innovative infrastructure, and in today's world, in the context of China's plans, the substrate of innovation is ICT capability. From a national perspective, China's need to innovate resonates with the basic tenets of competitiveness espoused by Michael Porter, co-chair of the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), an annual ranking produced by the World Economic Forum (WEF) of the competitiveness and growth prospects of 80 countries. As international trade flourishes, competitiveness increases and innovation becomes paramount. Porter believes that innovation is what drives and sustains competitiveness (Porter, 1990) . Moreover, he posits that there is no sustainable growth possible without technological improvements, because other potential determinants of growth eventually suffer diminishing returns. As put aptly by the WEF GCR for 2001 -2002, there are no diminishing returns on ideas.
Evaluating China's ICT Capabilities Relative to Competing Nations
China realizes the need to keep its ICT sophistication on an upward trajectory; however, this upward path may be dampened by the capabilities and perceived capacity of other countries that compete with China in international trade. From this perspective, China's continued economic expansion is not guaranteed.
A recent study by Gabberty and Calloway (2004) analyzed the relative rankings of China compared with various nations to elicit those ICT-related metrics that may impede China in its drive toward manufacturing innovation. Within this research stream, this paper extends the analysis of these ICT readiness component measures to further illuminate the effects of these data on China's readiness to innovate and interleaves analyses of quantitative indicator components from the World Bank. The specific countries included in this study were selected for comparison from two country groupings: The National Asia Pacific Economic and Scientific Database (NAPES, 2001 ) and the Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) from the WEF. The NAPES database is a comprehensive repository of long-term economic indicators for the Asia-Pacific region covering bilateral trade, economic and industrial research and development, and patents. The country selection criteria for those nations included in the NAPES database are simply those nations that have embarked on a path of economic development through trade; they are listed in table I.
The current study principally examines China's ICT capabilities with respect to its export-driven economic expansion goals, and therefore the NAPES country set is most appropriate. The 41 countries in the NAPES set are used to compare and analyze China's competitive position regarding ICT readiness both for the quantitative comparisons with the World Bank indicators and for the perceptual comparisons using the WEF-GCI measures. The Gabberty & Calloway (2004) study isolated forty-eight components that specifically characterize various aspects of ICT capability in China as observed by key executives surveyed in the WEF-GCR. The study ranked China in both the WEF-GCI country set and the NAPES country set to differentiate which components were ranked at least 10% lower in the export-driven NAPES country set, and that were also more than one standard deviation below the mean response for the component. This current study interprets these results in light of China's current competitive positioning, ICT development initiatives, and measured tangible assets as reported by the World Bank. This study also extracts those components and tangible asset capabilities that position China for ICT ascendancy in the ranks of export-driven countries. .
Faced with the problem of devising a set of components to measure ICT development in China from multiple dimensions, this research parallels the methods used by other authors; e.g., (Bui et al., 2002) by selecting relevant metrics from existing data. Also, to mitigate the challenges presented by multiple data sources (each with their own measurement criteria and inherent shortcomings), the study instead takes the approach of using a singular data source, namely, the metrics available from the WEF GCR. Thus, this approach eliminates inconsistent and overlapping measurements.
A second challenge of the study dealt with the problem of selecting which individual measures should be included. Since survey data is inherently ordinal and differences in the minds of the respondents are expected to exist among different Likert scale values, rating scores were normalized using the following method, based on the number of standard deviations that the rating score was away from the mean.
The means and standard deviations for every component relative to each country set was computed, resulting in a data set whose coarser granularity is more likely to reflect actual differences among the various country rating scores. The standard deviation for the country sets was added to or subtracted from each rating score. If this modified score was greater than the mean value of the set plus one standard deviation, it was assigned a score of '3'. If it was less than the average value minus one standard deviation, it was assigned a score of '1'. Otherwise, it was assigned a default score of '2' (see table II).
METHODLOGY FOR RATING ASSIGNMENT
If Component Mean + Standard Deviation > = rating score, assign a '3' If Component Mean -Standard Deviation < = rating score, assign a '1' Otherwise, assign a '2'.
Table II
Although the data reported in the WEF survey are perceptual, responses based on perception are assumed to reflect an individual's state of mind (Frake, 1966 ). An individual's intentions have been shown to be the antecedents for behavior (Ajzen, 2002; Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) . It is probable therefore to assume that these executive perceptions will contribute toward intentions to behave similarly. Thus, these perceptions are likely indicators of whether or not China is on a path toward ICT optimization.
According the Icek Ajzen (2002) , one of the originators of the Theory of Planned Behavior, "As a general rule, the more favorable the attitude and subjective norm, and the greater the perceived control, the stronger should be the person's intention to perform the behavior in question" (p 1). The formants of intention are described in relation to technology acceptance by Venkatesh & Davis (2000) in the expanded Technology Acceptance Model version 2.
The comparative study by Gabberty and Calloway (2004) revealed twelve ICT components that may put China at a greater risk than previously identified in the nation's efforts to move from an export-driven manufacturing economy into a knowledge-based economy (see Appendix B). If the component factors in the study had rating scores of '2' for the WEF set and '1' for the NAPES set; a value of '1' indicates that the score is more than one standard deviation below the mean. If the rankings were less than 10% apart the difference was considered spurious and the component was dropped. For these twelve differentiated components, China ranked lower within the set of export-driven economies competing against it in international trade.
The same twelve components emerge as critical factors that should be included in policy formulation by top Chinese executives. These components also generally ranked China in the lowest 15 th percentile, ranking below 35 out of 41 nations. More importantly, the extent of these disadvantages was hidden in the context of the larger, more diverse WEF country set.
Implications of the Extracted Perceptual Factors: The Lower-rated Factors
In comparison with the NAPES countries, China's rankings with respect to executive perceptions are generally low. Of the 48 components measured, China ranks in the lowest 20 percent against most of the NAPES export-driven nations. Twelve of the selected components, however, are remarkably low. Juxtaposed to the highly acclaimed growth of China's GDP, its first place ranking in Asia for foreign direct investment (FDI) and the nation's concurrent growth in per capita income, these ratings are strikingly glum.
Deterioration of the strength of public institutions is indicated by a total of five components (out of twelve) used as barometers of the overall ICT capability in the Gabberty and Calloway report. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) report noted that China dropped in rankings from 38 th to 44 th within their 80-country dataset (as opposed to the 75 countries in the WEF GCR); most of the drop was attributed to a lower perception of the quality of public institutions. These five factors are shown below in table III. 
EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING PERCEPTIONS OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

ICT
Table III
Three of the twelve measures in the lowest 10 th percentile pertain to overall Internet measures. Internet access in China is slow and expensive; the extent that the Internet has improved domestic firms' ability to coordinate with [domestic & international] customers and suppliers to reduce inventory costs is practically non -existent. Lastly, competition in the telecommunications sector is not sufficient to ensure high quality of service (QoS) levels, with a low mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) of critical system components that would lead to infrequent interruptions, and or low Internet prices for businesses and consumers. These factors are summarized in table IV.
Some of the more dismal perceptions of executives seem to fly against the heavy FDI penetration into the manufacturing sector. Production process sophistication placed in the lowest 25 th percentile, IT Training and Education Programs were rated in the lowest 5 th percentile and the assessment of the executives' companies' extent of staff training fell to the bottom-most 10 th percentile, along with Buyer Sophistication.
EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING PERCEPTIONS OF INTERNET CAPABILITIES
ICT Component
Executive Perception Rank (Percentile) Of the 48 components selected from the WEF GCR report to represent perceived ICT capabilities in China, seven components ranked above the mean for the NAPES country set. Significantly, all of these seven component ratings represent China's positive capacity for innovation (see Table V ). Given that China is well on its way to establishing itself as the world's default light-manufacturing center, its ability to consistently lower production costs through innovation remains paramount for the nations continued success. Because these seven factors where China ranks above the mean are areas that gauge innovation, china's ability to continue and indeed flourish in its pursuit of serving as the world's primary manufacturing center is entirely plausible.
EXTRACTED FACTORS REFLECTING INNOVATION CAPABILITY
Government procurement of Advanced Technology Products are made to encourage innovation Prioritization of ICT is perceived as Government a priority Government Programs promoting the use of ICT are successful In most industries competition in the local markets is perceived as good Competition in the local market comes from local firms or local competitors Entry of new competitors occurs in the local market Companies do obtain technology by pioneering their own new products or processes
Table V
Executive expert opinion is used in these and similar rankings to assess the relative capabilities of countries to compete in global markets and as previously noted, the opinions are considered as harbingers for executive action. This suggests that these components are important in that they foretell a brighter possible future driven by innovation.
Implications of the World Bank Indicators
Following the concept of ranking china against other countries in relation to ICT component measures, data collected by the World Bank for the NAPES countries was used to extract factors where China ranked either in the top ten countries or the bottom ten countries. Six of the hard data measures illustrate China's objective position against the export-driven countries of the NAPES database.
Implications of Lagging World Bank indicators
In some ICT categories, data from the World Bank places China among the lowest 25%, or among the lowest 10 ranking of the 41 countries listed in the NAPES database of exporting nations.
China's preoccupation with massive infrastructure projects (such as the Three Gorges Dam project and the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games) are tapping investment dollars that might otherwise have been put to use in extending the nation's ICT architecture. The nation's ravenous appetite for imported raw materials serves as a reminder of the enormity of the money being spent building up non-ICT infrastructure; for example, oil imports rose 30% in 2003, second only to the U.S., China's consumption of 50% of the world's production of cement, 30% of its coal, and 36% of its steel (Economist, February 1, 2004) .
It is not surprising that China's ICT expenditures as a percentage of GDP are not necessarily reflective of a nation bent on ICT mastery. From a per capita perspective, China's ICT spending does not bode any better ( figure  I) . The nation's rank in the context of the NAPES countries is in between the Philippines and Thailand; China's besting of its three subordinate countries (Vietnam, India, and Indonesia) also does not signal that a brighter Chinese future supported by ICT is likely. Figure II shows that the number of personal computers per thousand people places China ahead of Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Vietnam. This is surprising for a nation whose miraculous growth and massive foreign investment did not necessarily translate into higher levels of personal computing availability for its populous to leverage an increasingly knowledge-based global economy. Considering that according to World Bank statistics, China's foreign direct investment for 2001 stood at $44.2 billion, thirteen times that of India's $3.4 billion, it is disappointing that China's PC usage is only four times that of India's. Nevertheless, the low penetration of personal computers resonates with China's executives' evaluation of slow and expensive Internet access and deficient competition in the telecommunications sector. 
Discussion of Ascendant World Bank indicators
Placing in the top quartile of the NAPES database countries, China's ability to export high technology products ( figure III) is a wonderful indicator of the nation's ability to tap into its large, educated workforce and collect revenues exceeding competitor nations such as the Netherlands, Malaysia, Ireland, and Mexico, approaching the high technology export levels of Singapore, France, and the United Kingdom. China's 'online' population ( figure IV) is illustrative of a nation whose inhabitants are ready to take on the challenges posed by the "new economy", even in the face of very low rankings within the NAPES country set for several key internet components (see Table IV Table IT . NET.USER, World Development Indicators 2003, World Bank From the perspective that China is likely to take a lead role in the global economy, perhaps one of the most significant indicators to gauge is the number of personal computers installed in education (figure V). Approaching parity with Japan, albeit having a population five times that of Japan, China is at least investing in technology that is currently deployed in business the world over, especially the U.S. Assuming that the U.S. number of PCs in the classroom is a barometer of how critically important this type of technology is to prepare future business leaders.
China appears to be mimicking the notion that personal computing is essential. Exceeding the installed base of each European nation, China's impressive PC initiative will likely provide a benefit to the country in the near future. 
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Concluding Comments
Since the mid 1990's, China's economy has soared, emerging from a third world developing nation to an export-driven country offering access to a substantial low cost manufacturing base for many of the world's premiere multinationals. The MNCs, in pursuit of leveraging the investments made in ICT and other infrastructural programs, have driven the volume of international trade and inflows of foreign direct investment to astonishing levels. Japan, the former longstanding U.S. trade antagonist with huge trade surpluses with the U.S., has been supplanted by a burgeoning China.
This research begins to assess whether or not China can continue to weave its manufacturing firms into the global supply chain and to sustain their competitive position based on an innovation infrastructure that leverages ICT by making possible abundant international trade to occur. Extensive research has and continues to be done to track China's economic meteoric trajectory and this research shows that sustained economic growth is predicated on continuing to fostering innovation, largely based on ICT transfer and absorption. For China to avoid repeating the mistakes of Mexico, another nation with a seemingly meteoric ascent to impressive trade output only to be outdone by China, it must sustain its capacity to innovate by upgrading its education, learning and information infrastructure.
The responses of key executives surveyed by the WEF GCR portray China's competitive position as substantially below other nations with whom it competes. In fact, a previous analysis of China's rankings among export-driven nations by Gabberty and Calloway isolated 12 components where the China rank fell in the lowest 20 th percentile, or below 32 of 41 countries. Several of these components represented confidence in public institutions such as the quality of public education and protection of intellectual property rights and consumer protection, while other low ranking components represented cost, quality and competition in the Internet sector. The poorly perceived or actual quality of public institutions in a communist state may hamper endogenous innovation. Further, if gaps in IC T support left by poor public institutional performance are closed by yet more involvement by wholly -owned foreign enterprises, ICT absorption and innovation may be compromised if this technology transfer is not fully absorbed.
Although the mean perceptions of China's executives are remarkably low, the seven components with measures above the mean all represented China's positive capacity to innovate. These perceptions are in accord with World Bank data illustrating that although personal computers (using per capita figures) places China in 37 th out of 41 countries, the number of personal computers installed in education puts China in third, below only Japan and the United States.
The positive implications for innovation drawn from these indicators is hopeful, and belies the notion that China, along with its hosted MNCs are deriving benefit from China's low-cost labor and high manufacturing capacity at the expense of the nation's deteriorating infrastructure and its power to sustain innovation.
Future Research Suggestions
China is poised at a crossroads: one path leads the nation to enlarging its infrastructure -fueled by inflows of foreign capital and the other path advises cautionary containment of this continued growth. From the MNC perspective, continue expansion of its manufacturing centers and (similar to India) development of a thriving service sector are imperatives that will lead to increased profit streams for shareholders. From the consumer perspective (both in China and elsewhere), China's continued expansion will lead to lower-priced goods and (ultimately) higher energy costs as fossil and coal fuel supplies dwindle. Finally, continued economic cooperation between China and the rest of the world will lead to intensification of multilateral obligations and, in the long term, reduce the likelihood of political friction with this nation that is attempting to become a successful Communist-led market economy following the tenets of capitalism.
Subsequent research, fostering development of expressive thought and insight into the viability of bridging these two opposing ideologies, is warranted, perhaps using as a starting points the speculations of noted Asian author James Fallows (1994) , illustrated in Appendix C.
Appendix A SELECT ICT COMPONENTS THAT INFLUENCE NATIONAL EXPORT COMPETITIVENESS
Category
Title Description The legal framework in your country supports the development of IT businesses (1=no, strongly impedes, 7=yes, significantly promotes)
Technological innovation and diffusion
General infrastructure
Overall Infrastructure Quality General infrastructure in your country is (1=poorly developed and inefficient, 7=among the best in the world)
Quality of Public Schools Public (free) schools in your country are (1=of poor quality, 7=equal to the best in the world) Telephone/Fax Infrastructure Quality New telephone lines for your business are (1=scarce and difficult to obtain, 7=widely available and highly reliable)
Electricity Prices
The price of electricity per kilowatt-hour in your country compared to international standards is (1=much higher, 7=among the world's lowest) Public institutions: contracts and law
Intellectual Property Protection
Intellectual property protection in your country is (1=weak or non-existent, 7=equal to the world's most stringent)
Burden of Regulation Administrative regulations in your country are (1=burdensome, 7=not burdensome) Domestic competition
Intensity of Local Competition
In most industries, competition in the local market is (1=limited and price-cutting is rare, 7=intense and market leadership In your industry, process machinery is (1=almost always imported, 7=almost always sourced locally.
Local Availability of Specialized Research and Training Services
In your industry, specialized research and training services are (1=not available in the country, 7=available from world-class local institutions) Local Availability of Information Technology Services
In your industry, specialized IT services are (1=not available in the country, 7=available from world-class local institutions)
Company operations and strategy
Value Chain Presence
Exporting companies in your country (1=are involved primarily in production, 7=conduct not just in production but also product development, distribution and marketing)
Capacity for Innovation Companies obtain technology (1=exclusively from foreign companies, 7=by pioneering their own new products or processes) Uniqueness of Product Designs Product designs are (1=copied or licensed from abroad, 7=developed locally) Production Process Sophistication Production processes generally (1=use obsolete technology, 7=employ the world's best and most efficient technology)
Extent of Staff Training
In your country, companies general approach to human resources is to invest (1=little in training and development, 7=heavily to attract, train and retain staff) Quality of Management Schools Management schools in your country are (1=limited and of poor quality, 7=among the world's best) Breadth of International Markets Exporting companies from your country sell (1=primarily in a few foreign markets, 7= in virtually all international markets)
Internet Effects on Business
To what extent has the Internet improved your firm's ability to coordinate with customers and suppliers to reduce inventory costs (1=no change, 7=huge improvement)
